Moral Hazard: Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders?

Examines the issue of moral hazard inrelation to IMF loans to countries in financial difficulties. Concerns about moral hazard have had a prominent place in recent discussions on how the architecture of the international financial system should be reformed and what the IMF’s role should be.
Volume/Issue: Volume 2002 Issue 003
Publication date: May 2002
ISBN: 9781589060883
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Topics covered in this book

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Business and Economics , Banks and Banking , Finance , EI , financing , investor , yield , lending , market , IMF press , financing package , liquidity position , IMF action , IMF guarantee , financial support , Moral hazard , Emerging and frontier financial markets , Systemically important financial institutions , Yield curve , Asia and Pacific

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Summary

Examines the issue of moral hazard inrelation to IMF loans to countries in financial difficulties. Concerns about moral hazard have had a prominent place in recent discussions on how the architecture of the international financial system should be reformed and what the IMF’s role should be.

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